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Abstract: To promote a controversial policy, a leader must find factors that are
favorable to change, and neutralize (or minimize) the opposition to it. In advo-
cating the revised Sejong City plan, the government, including the president, the
prime minister, and an advisory panel, encountered deep-rooted opposition—
initially from a minority within the ruling party, and then from residents of
Chung-cheong Province and the opposition parties. The prime minister’s abrupt
approach, without prior consultation with ruling party members, and his desperate
yet hasty attempt to expand a policy coalition, was not able to reconcile the differ-
ences in this case. Incentives for opposing groups were not well established. The
ruling party’s defeat in local elections made it even more difficult to move for-
ward with the revised plan. Cognition theory, in particular a simplified version
of Howard Gardner’s concept of seven levers for changing minds, provides a
useful analytical tool for understanding this case.
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INTRODUCTION
Policy evolution usually involves incremental changes. If there is an abrupt policy
change, with dramatic and radical changes both of direction and contents, leaders must
act carefully to reduce friction and change the minds of the involved parties. Extensive
political mobilization and coalition building are often required, especially in decentral-
izing democracy, to overcome entrenched interests. Policy entrepreneurs should create
a dynamic between the politics of subsystems and the macropolitics of the legislature
and the presidency (James et. al., 1999).
When members of a heterogeneous populace attempt to maximize their own bene-
fits, political leadership should be skillfully exercised in relation to politicians, interest
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groups, and the diverse residents of different provinces. The complex system of over-
lapping authority, the multiple motivations of political actors, and the myriad of
groups with a variety of political identities create opportunities for political entrepre-
neurship (Fuchs, 2010, pp. 70-75). But leaders must find the factors that will impel
people to change their minds, and must not underestimate the opposition. Their
approach must be creative, well designed and planned, and executed skillfully in a
step-by-step process in order to reduce opposition and nurture a growing coalition of
supporters.
This article analyzes the prime minister’s role in the revised Sejong City plan,
within a theoretical frame of cognitive leadership based on a simplified version of
Gardner’s seven “levers” for changing minds.
BACKGROUND
Original Plan
The Roh Moo-hyun government (2003-2008) devised an ambitious plan in 2003 to
relocate the capital to a small, newly built city in Chung-cheong Province as the cen-
terpiece of his administration. But the Constitutional Court ruled in October 2004 that
the relocation was unconstitutional, because the Constitution refers to Seoul as the
capital of Korea. The Roh administration then created an alternative plan to construct
a multifunctional administrative city, in which nine major ministries and four agencies
would be relocated from Seoul to nearby Kwachoen City. This political swing region
continued to claim that the construction of the administrative city should be carried out
as it was mentioned in the original plan, whenever anyone called for revision. The new
city was expected to have more than 500,000 residents by 2030.
Revision Attempts
During the 2007 presidential campaign, Lee Myung-bak pledged to follow through
with the former government’s original plan for an administrative city. He changed
course after he was elected and even said that he was ashamed of having backed the
project during the campaign.
After the election, the president’s office researched alternatives that would allow
the new city to operate self-sufficiently without causing inefficiencies in government.
In a report to the president on July 21, 2008, the National Balanced Development
Commission raised the need for institutional arrangements and strong incentives in
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order to build a self-sufficient city at the designated location. When Chung Un-chan
was appointed prime minister on September 3, 2009, he mentioned the inefficiencies
of the city and said that the original plan would not be executed.
On November 4, 2009, the prime minister proposed to turn the plan into an economi-
cally viable city based on education, science, and industry. The government established
a joint government-civilian advisory panel on Sejong City (hereafter referred to as the
Joint Panel), co-chaired by the prime minister. On January 8, 2010, the president said
that the government and the ruling party should push ahead with the revised Sejong
City plan. On January 11, the government officially scrapped the initial plan, and the
prime minister announced a new master plan, devised by the Joint Panel, to build an
economically self-sufficient city focusing on education and science, in close partner-
ship with leading businesses and educational institutions (Office of the Prime Minister,
2010).
The government offered incentives for local and foreign firms, as well as universi-
ties, to move into the city, including additional apartments, job training, community
facilities, and cheaper farmland. Several conglomerates had plans to invest trillions:
Samsung, Hanwha, Lotte, Woongjin, and Austria’s SSF agreed to build new production,
research, or business facilities. KAIST and Korea University also had plans to extend
their research facilities and set up graduate schools in the city. And a global science
business belt was going to be established along the ring of the city. The new master
plan called for Sejong City to become a mecca of science and technology, with a pop-
ulation of 500,000, and for total investment to reach 8 trillion won by 2020, creating
250,000 jobs.
Political Struggle
The announcement touched off immediate and intense conflict within the ruling
party and drew a strong backlash from the opposition parties, especially from the Lib-
eral Forward Party, whose support base is in the Chung-cheong area. Residents of the
region protested immediately. To make matters worse, the government’s offer of
incentives to prospective investors and immigrant institutions, such as low land prices
and reduced taxes, provoked opposition from other provinces that had been competing
to attract industry and business.
The prime minister succeeded in making his point to the nation. And his approach
could be considered normal strategic political behavior in the Korean cultural patrimo-
ny. But conflict expanded beyond the Joint Panel’s anticipation. Park Geun-hye, for-
mer leader of the Grand National Party (GNP), lost no time in firmly rejecting the
government’s new plan, and she launched a direct political challenge to the president
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and the prime minister. In addition, the main opposition Democratic Party, which had
87 seats, and the conservative Liberal Forward Party, which had 18 seats, were deter-
mined to terminate the revised plan. Its chance of passing in the National Assembly
seemed slim.
The government announced the revised plan bill on January 27, 2010, and submitted
it to the National Assembly on March 23. Politicians wrangled over the issue, creating
alternative plans and inventing consensus-building methods, until it died. Various alter-
native development plans were proposed, as well as the idea of a national referendum
and the dismissal of the prime minister. The mass media covered the debate, in the legis-
lature and among civil groups, thoroughly.
Within the ruling party, several compromise plans, including relocation of several
other government ministries, were proposed. Those proposals acknowledged the diffi-
culties of relocating the many ministries and agencies mentioned in the original plan
and suggested, instead, relocating the judicial branch and related institutions, and min-
istries related to education, science, agriculture, and the environment.
The idea of putting the plan to a national referendum gained momentum within the
ruling party. Ruling party leaders were fully aware that the chances of passing the new
plan in the Assembly were low, given pro-Park legislators’ opposition. Opposition
parties, meanwhile, threatened to submit a motion to oust the prime minister to the
Assembly, refusing to accept the proposal for a referendum. In the end, the ruling
party did not move forward with the referendum, because it failed to get the presi-
dent’s support.
Different options were suggested regarding the decision-making method—for
example, to postpone it until the general election of 2012, in order to hand the plan
over to the next government. But a general meeting of all members of the ruling party
failed to come up with a conclusive alternative to the government bill. The prime min-
ister was struggling to make a breakthrough at this point. He visited Chung-cheong
Province 13 times to visit the proposed city site, talk with residents and local leaders,
and conduct interviews with the local press. The Joint Panel made every effort to pro-
mote the merits of the new plan. The issue was the top priority on the national agenda
until the sinking of the battleship Chunan on March 26, 2010.
In the local elections held on June 3, 2010, none of the candidates in the Chung-
cheong region who supported the revised plan were elected. From a nationwide point
of view, this was a severe defeat for the ruling party, and it affected the fate of the revi-
sion plan. On June 29, 2010, lawmakers voted down the revision bill 164-105, rein-
stating the original plan. About 50 followers of Park’s faction voted against the revised
plan, along with members of the opposing parties.
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METHODOLOGY
Scope
This article focuses on the political leadership of policy change—in particular, the
interaction between the prime minister, who exercised such leadership, politicians who
dealt with the issue, and members of the public. Because the political leadership came
from the prime minister, empowered by the president, he is assumed to be the initiator
of policy change—that is, a policy entrepreneur—and his actions, rather than the spe-
cific details of the plans or the political calculus of other, indirectly involved actors—
are the focus of this article.
The traditional study of political leadership deals with two perspectives: the
accomplishments of leaders, and the institutional and social constraints in the exercise
of leadership (Jones, 1989, p. 3). The latter perspective was adapted to analyze this
case, with emphasis on the mental process involved in exercising leadership, and the
institutional and social context within which a leader operates and which determines
much of his or her ability to portray or transform policy issues in the most advanta-
geous way.
At the risk of oversimplification, it can be said that transforming leadership depends
on the social environment, institutions (or structures), and the political skills of the
leader. In order to change public policy in a given context, a policy leader must change
the alignment of structures and institutions, and the minds of relevant elites and the
general public. When a leader cannot realign structures, then the last resort is to
change minds. The leadership theory of cognitive psychology offers insights into the
process of transforming key politicians’ minds and changing opinions in a heteroge-
neous constituency.
Methods
The political process is influenced by many material factors, but its prime locus is
in the mind. It is a mental process in which leaders define a problematic situation,
make a decision about how to deal with it, and appeal for a positive response to their
new policy (Tucker, 1995, pp. 59-61). Leadership’s task is to sway the minds of ordi-
nary people as well as major policy participants toward acceptance of its proposal.
In the case of Sejong City, from the perspective of the change agent (the prime
minister), there are three layers of participants: politicians, the residents of the Chung-
cheong region, and the general public. A leader must choose which issues to push and
how to push them. According to cognitive psychology, the exercise of leadership is
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based on an emerging scientific understanding of how the mind works, how people
change the minds of others as well as their own minds, and how they envision new
scenarios and work to achieve them.
Based on historical cases, Gardner (2004) identified seven mind-changing “levers”:
reason, research, resonance, representational redescriptions, resources and rewards,
real-world events, and resistances. This theoretical framework seems well suited to
describing political leadership in general and the Sejong City debate in particular. But
some modifications are needed to enhance their explanatory power in this specific
case.
As discussed above, the leadership began advocating its agenda for Sejong City as
the prime minister took office, there were three target groups, and the policy targeted
for change had been a politically sensitive issue for several years. Therefore, modify-
ing Gardner’s levers to emphasize the process aspect—by combining reason and
research into one category, rational argumentation—can provide a more comprehen-
sive analysis.
Because a new leader entered the stage and attempted to drastically change a poli-
cy that had been a troublesome issue and the focus of tumult and strenuous effort, the
exercise of leadership has unique features in this case. So the author added process
management aspects of policy change to each lever. Strategies for raising the issue,
shaping the terms of debate, and choosing the timing and sequence of building up a
coalition and networking in political circles were crucial for striking a resonant chord
with the policy audience and reducing resistance. Drastic change is sure to invite resis-
tance. A policy entrepreneur cannot completely overcome protracted resistance, so the
process must be skillfully managed in an effort to subdue or evade opposition.
The analytical framework for this study could be described as follows:








4. Resources and rewards
5. Real-world events
6. Resistance
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In this case, especially, the aspect of resistance should be considered carefully in
dealing with other relevant levers, because the policy had already been established in
the form of a specific law, and the early stage of implementation was underway. Mind
changing is unlikely to occur when resistance is stronger than motives for change.
From the prime minister’s point of view, it was necessary to exercise leadership,
involving the six levers listed above, with the three layers or target groups. Conceptually,
once politicians, including members of both the ruling party and opposition parties,
have been persuaded, it then becomes necessary to persuade the residents of Chung-
cheong Province—or this might even be done simultaneously. Then, the prime minister
must acquire the consent of the general population. Different leadership activities can




Reason and research, as explained by Gardner, appeal to the cognitive aspects of
the human mind. When a political leader laid out the problems and weaknesses of the
original plan and presented his alternative solution to those problems, there was a
chance that the minds of politicians, interest groups, and fellow citizens might be
swayed by his appeal. But before anything else, through arguments and debates, he
must acquire reasonable support for the revised plan, prepared as a scientific and logi-
cal endeavor, among the members of the ruling party.
While the original plan took the view that decentralization could be realized
through relocation of official government buildings to Sejong City, the new plan con-
sidered that this would create inefficiencies and the city would not prosper or become
self-sufficient. The prime minister attempted to frame the policy issue in relation to the
economy, which was his major playing field, believing that this would be an effective
way of appealing to diverse interests in the region.
The Joint Panel devised a new plan for an economically focused, market-oriented
city instead of a power-oriented administrative center. Educational institutions would
bring in young students, brilliant researchers, and other developmental facilities. In
addition, investments by conglomerates and foreign enterprises would produce a new
growth engine that would generate jobs and attract more residents, making the city
self-sufficient.
This was markedly different from the original plan: there would be no government
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agencies; instead, the city would become a hub for the knowledge industry. The Joint
Panel did not hint that the possibility of moving several government agencies was still
open and that those new arrangements could be made in the process of the legislative
deliberation. Actually, several members of the ruling party proposed an alternative
revised plan when they spoke in the National Assembly, which included relocation of
several education- and science-related agencies or judicial institutions. But the govern-
ment did not respond carefully to such proposals. It stuck to the principle that any sep-
aration of the executive branch would result in huge inefficiencies, and did not consid-
er relocation of even a small number of government agencies.
If the Joint Panel had carefully assessed the turbulent waters of intra-party politics
and the cohesion of opposing groups, it could have considered moving some govern-
ment offices. A sensible combination of government buildings, relocation of institu-
tions, and market-oriented investments could have made it possible to overcome oppo-
sition to the plan.
In politics, it is sometimes necessary to emphasize features of a policy other than its
substantive merits. The new plan was composed of diverse components needed for a
city to grow. But core features, like the concept of a government complex, had been
erased completely. To members of the National Assembly, the new plan did not seem
plausible or possible to expedite smoothly. Exercising leadership of the legislature
requires skillful framing of the issue (Neustadt, 1980; Burns and MacGregor, 1984, pp.
30-34). The proponents of the revised plan, however, had a closed mindset that would
not consider moving even a single government office in the name of administrative effi-
ciency. This was not a skillful way of persuading politicians who had already showed
their strong support for relocation of government agencies into the city.
The new plan clearly offered a potential growth engine for the city and compensated
for weak points in the original plan with diverse policy tools, such as a variety of incen-
tives. But the changed plan met with strong opposition from Chung-cheong residents.
While the majority of the people nationwide showed accent to the new plan, the majority
of Chung-cheong residents favored the original plan. Incentives for industrial investment
in Sejong City could take away opportunities from other provinces and other innovation
cities that are under construction. This possibility has contributed to reducing general
support nationwide. The prime minister tried to foster public support by visiting Chung-
cheong several times, but he has not found it easy to convince the residents.
The Joint Panel’s approach was all-or-nothing and overly hasty. In politics, no one
should expect to get all of what they want. US President Ronald Reagan once said, “If
you got seventy-five or eighty percent of what you were asking for, I say, you take it
and fight for the rest later” (Strock, 1998, p. 70). Although the Korean president has a
more dominant political position in the nation than the American president, an abrupt
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policy shift without prudent consultation with the legislature is not likely to succeed.
With the revised plan, the government was able to persuade the conservative part
of the populace and succeeded in getting more than 50 percent of support nationwide
during the early phase. Many people who were worried about the self-sufficiency of
Sejong City welcomed the prime minister’s announcement that he would devise a new
plan that would promote both regional and national interests to the highest degree.
Even during the conflict over revision, residents in metropolitan Seoul and other areas
remained relatively supportive. But the revision invoked the same controversial issues
that were raised when the idea was first proposed, such as division of the capitol,
administrative efficiency, and effects on decentralization. Even within the ruling party,
the Joint Panel was not able to form a coalition to support its proposal.
Resonance
Resonance concerns the affective component of human mind. A proposal resonates
to the extent that it feels right to an individual, seems to fit the current situation, and
convinces the person that further considerations are superfluous. Resonance often
comes about because one feels a relation to a mind-changer, finds that person reliable,
or respects that person (Gardner, 2004, p. 16). As a former president of Seoul National
University, and an economist, the prime minister tried to exercise a high level of lead-
ership with honest and heartfelt sentiments. He was committed to advocating the mer-
its of the new plan.
The prime minister’s authority gave him the power to command attention from
politicians as well as the public, and the fact that he was born in Chung-cheong
Province gave him credibility. He made a good public display of his intentions and
found many cameras whirring about him during press conferences on the revision
plan. Major daily newspapers and radio and television stations covered the revision
plan, and the issue emerged as the top priority on the national agenda.
Attention is the currency of leadership (Heifetz, 1994, p. 113). But attention should
be backed up by assets such as a political power base, popularity, and cohesive force.
There should have been extensive preparation before announcing the policy; the prime
minister should have kept contact with influential players before the announcement and
let them voice their opinions, in order to expand the coalition supporting the plan and
deepen its cohesion. But he was not a seasoned politician or a talented political commu-
nicator who exuded credibility during the early phase of his tenure. He announced a poli-
cy change without first making a serious consensus-building effort, including consulta-
tion with ruling party leaders. A leader should move in concert with political allies, not
alone, and should go to considerable lengths to network (Mintrom & Vergara, 1996).
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When transforming a situation, the leader needs an array of supporters in many
areas as well as political and institutional resources. The prime minister seemed to suc-
ceed in the initial stage in rallying people who had doubts about the implementation of
the original plan. They naturally created a friendly, cooperative climate of resonant
reality, a climate that fostered a positive outlook on the future (Zander & Zander,
2000, p. 36). Although there have been diverse attempts by the prime minister and an
amicable faction in the GNP, who strongly want the success of the president, to get a
favorable consensus from party supporters, they could not find effective ways of using
dissent as a source of insight and options for further consideration prior to announcing
execution of the new plan. They were not able to find appropriate ways to inspire the
formal and informal cooperation of local social groups whose support was critical to
the success of this policy change under the conditions of a hostile environment
(Selznick, 1996, pp. 272-275).
Because the administrative city bill had been passed in the legislative long ago, the
prime minister’s argument that the original plan would result in a ghost town and a
disaster for the nation, and that the plan was defended based on partisan interest rather
than the national interest, was treated as a sort of bigotry. Former GNP chairwoman
Park Geun-hye and her faction were unyielding in their attitude toward the original
plan. She had been the leader of the GNP, then the opposition party, when the progres-
sive government party passed the administrative city bill; some GNP lawmakers voted
in favor of it, although she abstained. And the opposition parties opposed this notion
stoutly. Park’s followers argued that it was a promise to the nation, especially to
Chung-cheong residents.
Park once said that all of the decentralization policies so far had turned out to be
failures, but that Sejong City would cause a paradigm shift. Changing position and
pushing a new plan would be a tough political decision for Park’s faction, because
they respected her for placing top priority on keeping her promise. She implied that no
one can lead a nation with trust to keep the promise only. The media transformed the
issue into a confrontation between “the national interest” and “trust,” diminishing the
possibility of compromise. While it was beyond the prime minister’s influence to play
down the symbolic implications of the issue, rhetorical hot air was generated by oppo-
sition groups. The prime minister was not able to ensure that the issues would be
debated in terms of efficiency of government, regional economic development, sci-
ence, and technological innovation.
Also, the widespread belief that the prime minister would be a potential competitor
in the upcoming presidential election might have given Park’s faction an impetus to
oppose him. That was one of the reasons his new plan evoked instantaneous revolt
from that faction. Some political observers predicted that Park would benefit from the
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revision battle because the residents of the region would stand behind her and ulti-
mately support her in the coming election. The pattern of offer, response, and counter-
response, which is common in politically adversary situations, has not been observed;
rather, it has been a single-shot game without the dynamism of a sequential pattern.
In a nationwide survey in the early stage, respondents favoring the revision plan
outnumbered those who favored the original plan. In the Chung-cheong region, how-
ever, most residents later firmly opposed the revision plan. In the context of a weak
associational culture, the divided opinion in the region, and the resignation of Gover-
nor Lee Wan-gu in protest against the revision policy, the maneuvering room for the
prime minister as policy changer was very restricted. He emphasized that the new plan
contained a powerful vision, but that sentiment was not communicated well or shared
by opposing groups in the region.
Representational Redescription
A change of mind becomes convincing to the extent that it lends itself to represen-
tation in a number of different forms that reinforce one another. The factors in this
include broader aspects of the lever that changes the minds of the attentive audience
and the general public. In order to affect the minds of a large and diverse citizenry,
leaders must depend heavily on diverse representations of the revised plan and a cen-
tral message, not to mention their personal background and character. A compelling
story about a new vision of change should be embedded in the leader’s life. Leaders
should find simple ways to promote their ideas based on their own stories and life
experiences in order to relate to diverse constituents’ minds.
The general outline of the city construction plan, however, could not be changed
fundamentally, because the land was acquired and there was little room to change the
basic configuration of the city. The site had already undergone leveling and grading.
The fact that the prime minister’s hometown is in Chung-cheong Province could not
help him to exercise the leadership needed to persuade the residents. On the contrary,
the resignation of the governor in December 2009, protesting the revision, intensified
residents’ opposition.
President Lee was the mayor of Seoul when former President Rho proposed move-
ment of the capitol city and later formulated the Sejong City plan. Lee opposed that
agenda. Although he agreed to the administrative city plan during his presidential
campaign, he confessed, just before the prime minister opened the discussion on the
revision plan, that he was ashamed of this compromise. For two years after his inaugu-
ration, he did not try to develop alternatives or deepen a political coalition. This did
not help accustom people to a revised (redescriptive) model for Sejong City.
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The prime minister was not known for siding with the president, but taking a posi-
tive attitude toward revising the Sejong City plan, even before the formal appointment,
created confusion. He had said in 2004 that the city should be built as a location for the
capital of a unified Korea. The prime minister had often criticized the Lee government’s
policies, such as the tax cut and the cross-country canal project. But he accepted the
president’s offer, helping the president to initiate a centrist-pragmatist policy direction.
Also the press pointed out that the appointment was a winning card for the president
as it could serve as a check on his intraparty rival, Park Geun-hye.
In addition, the fact that the prime minister was born in Chung-cheong Province
initially made people listen to him, although his background did not prove politically
helpful because he had not formed a solid support base in his home town. The fact that
he was an economist lent credibility to his policy orientation toward a more market-
friendly revision of the city plan. If there had been a neutral plan, involving relocation
of several government agencies as well as additional investments by industry, then
room for exercising leadership could have been expanded, and could have led to a
change of mind by opposition groups and diverse constituents.
Resources and Rewards
While politics is partly about ideas, it is also about the accumulation and deploy-
ment of resources. Rewarding and disciplining are explicit tools of transaction leader-
ship (Burns, 1978). Mind change is more likely to occur when considerable resources
can be devoted to the issue. Sanctions or discipline, which is the other side of rewards,
are also useful in selling a policy or negotiating, even from a position of strength. In
order to pass a bill in the legislature, a leader must expand the core support base and
possibilities of acceptance by conferring various resources, such as economic benefits,
power, prestige, budget, and position. A leader must offer potential followers a set of
benefits, some of these potential followers must be willing to buy, and the followers
must continue to expect a net gain (Moe, 1980, pp. 38-39).
Policies are, in a sense, nothing more than vehicles for the distribution of benefits
to groups of constituents. The residents were interested in a new package of policy
benefits that would be delivered to them. The new plan has offered special incentives—
low land prices and tax reduction—to prospective investors; many large firms showed
interest in investing, and two universities intended to move in. Also, a major project
for a global science belt, which includes a convergence-complex basic science center,
an accelerator, and an advanced international science school, were planned for the
western side of the city.
In the province, residents’ opinions have been divided. Proponents argued that in
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decades, Sejong City would become a mecca for science and technology firms, with a
population of about 500,000, and the total investment would be 18 trillion won by
2020, creating 250,000 jobs. The new plan calls for the completion of the city by 2020,
10 years earlier than called for in the original plan. But it did not convey the tangible
benefits to all residents. More than half of the Chung-cheong residents seemed not to
be satisfied with the additional benefits the new plan would bring. They were most
united on having a single plank of multifunctional administrative town.
In addition, unlike in a general election or presidential popularity (Heinz & Lewis,
1985), specific policy benefits had far more influence than probable future welfare of
the residents (Stone, 2002, pp. 210-230). Several other provinces, such as Kyungbuk
and Jeonnam, were worried about losing potential benefits if the plan was not revised;
residents of other provinces were worried about benefits they might lose if the plan
was revised. They argued that changing the plan in a way that serves certain regions at
the expense of others is not responsible leadership. People who were concerned about
efficiency or the general state of the economy and its likely rate of progress did not
seem to be effectively organized to support the government, although the benefits of
the new plan were significant.
The president said in August 2009 that he would have little to gain politically, and
predicted that the revision would cost him much of his political capital. When the
GNP supported the original plan, the political calculation turned out to be favorable.
With local elections coming up in 2006, the GNP, a minority party at the time, found
itself in a bind. Party leaders worried that tenacious opposition would cost them votes
in the swing region, without being able to stop the plan in the National Assembly.
Some GNP lawmakers voted yes when the original city bill passed. Therefore, the
Park Geun-hae faction had to find additional benefits to revert their attitude. Park’s
faction did not perceive additional net benefits from the revision; they would lose their
reputation for political principle.
The president as well as the prime minister had difficulty finding resources to help
coax the members of Park’s faction into supporting the revision. The Liberal Forward
Party, based in the Chung-cheong region, would lose its power base if the new bill
passed. They led the opposition and attacked the government, exploiting a divided
public opinion. Other opposition parties attacked the government for not keeping the
political faith because they would be losers, too, if the bill passed.
Real-World Events
An effective leader has to move beyond individual incentives to the development
of cooperation and trust. A significant event or an unwavering fact affects many indi-
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viduals who are contemplating a mind change for cooperation and trust. Foreign as
well as domestic examples of location of government facilities encourage a change of
mind. A similar case in Germany years ago (moving the capital from Bonn to Berlin)
was presented as a bad example, and that also raised disputes and did not help the gov-
ernment’s position. The domestic case of the Daejeon government building also did
not succeed in making a spark in the fireplace of political vortex. The advantages and
disadvantages of the administrative office separation cannot be measured systematical-
ly for everyone to agree upon, and the background behind the separation is complicat-
ed and thus difficult to address conclusively. Tedious arguments for and against the
separation emerged once again, and no new decisive blow was made on either side.
No additional hard evidence emerged that the city could not be self-sufficient.
The Daejeon administrative complex, established in 1988 near the new town, took
more than 10 years before the rate of officials living in Daejeon with their families sur-
passed 60 percent, and it seemed that the future of Sejong City might be little different.
Surveys showed that less than half of the affected public officials would migrate to the
provincial town with their families. The poor residential and educational environment
of the new town could not induce enough prospective residents to move into the city.
Those arguments and facts, however, did not change most people’s minds; most con-
tinued to support the original concept of a multifunctional administrative city.
Local elections held on June 2, 2010, could have been an opportunity to gain
momentum in persuasion. Sejong City was a high priority in this election, along with
free lunches for school children, four major river projects, and the response to the Cheo-
nan sinking (Chosun Daily, May 13, 2010; Kyunghyang Daily, May 27, 2010). But the
ruling party experienced stunning setbacks in this election, losing all three local gover-
nors’ positions in the Chung-cheong area. The government is no longer advocating the
revision plan; the fate of the city has fallen into the National Assembly’s hands. Major
investors have begun to rethink their earlier commitments. The nation had to go back to
square one. There were no winners except the vehement opposition groups: the prime
minister, the government, the ruling party, and the people have all become losers.
Resistance
Mind changing is unlikely to happen when resistance is strong, the policy entrepre-
neur is not able to find an effective way to reduce it, and the five other factors
described above do not point strongly toward change. Building a new coalition and
skillfully managing conflict was essential to overcome resistance (Burns, 2003, pp.
120-136) The expansion of a support base within the governing party was essential to
restore vitality to efforts to transform the equilibrium that had been hardening during
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the two years since the inauguration of the new president. The prime minister as well
as the president should find means to tilt the balance of existing factions within the
GNP and fend off the serious threat to their political leadership.
The GNP provided an optimal environment for the new prime minister’s possible
pursuit of the presidency in 2012, compared to the previous contenders who joined the
presidential race. To the prime minister, revision of the Sejong City plan was a good
chance stand for jump on the contention, but he faced considerable resistance at the
beginning of his pursuit of the Sejong City plan revision. The Park faction criticized
his revision efforts with a fine sense of political timing. They perceived that the appear-
ance of the prime minster as a major actor on the political scene, and his success in
revising the Sejong City plan, would make him a strong competitor to Park in the next
presidential election. Therefore they took a stand against the revision from the begin-
ning. They did not try to adjust their position, because they understood that presenting
a solid opposition would pay off politically.
The Liberal Forward Party, as mentioned above, could not take even one step back
from their original position because if they did so, their power base would collapse. The
other opposition parties, whose platform depended on execution of the original plan,
took advantage of the region’s tense atmosphere in the local elections and residents’
cohesive opposition groups. The size and density of the opposition coalition never
dwindled, and their forces have remained united against the prime minister. They were
unanimous in their hatred for the group that led the revision plan and continuously
mobilized and spearheaded the opposition.
The prime minister has attempted to appeal to the public directly in order to put
more pressure on the opposition groups (Kernell, 1986), but the resistance from resi-
dents of Chung-cheong Province hindered him from carrying out this approach and
eventually defeated him. They cast doubt on his credibility, and he faced a crisis in
leadership. The prevailing resistance, which was hardened by political calculation,
could not be overcome in a short period of time by a new political conscript.
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION
Importance of Process and Structure in Policy Leadership
Prime Minister Chung Un-chan resigned on July 29, 2010, taking responsibility for
“prompting concerns and disputes” nationwide over his failed attempt to revise the
Sejong City plan. From the beginning, he was observed to be too hasty and reckless in
his push to change the plan. Before his inauguration, he had voiced his resolution to
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advocate for revision. He too quickly adopted a conclusive plan for revision rather
than opening up a forum for discussion and deliberation—a very volatile political
course. Process management of leadership activities should have been well prepared;
instead, he rapidly attempted to exercise leadership as soon as he took office, without
first attempting to cultivate a reputation.
He should have found creative ways of pushing the politically sensitive revision
issue, by modulating surrounding structures. His diagnosis of the issue and the situation
was criticized as not accurate. Nor was he assisted in his deliberation and decision-
making in this politically adversary situation by high-ranking government officials and
potential allies. How well such a bid succeeds depends on how the situation is struc-
tured so as to convince others to support it, and how the policy debate unfolds.
It was not easy to find any collective character of the process of leadership when
the revised plan was pronounced. The prime minister needed strategies for expanding
his advocacy coalition and presenting the proposal in a convincing way, further build-
ing national consensus by uniting a diverse populace in a positive response. Using
only one mind-changing lever, rational argumentation, which has repeatedly divided
groups without conclusion, he lacked the power to change the minds of key actors and
the general population.
The qualities that make for effective mobilization of support are not always com-
bined in one and the same person with those that are requisite for devising policy.
Thorough knowledge of incentives, political cleavages, and levels of resistance is, for
a political leader, the first step toward the construction of alliances. But using that
knowledge to mobilize support is quite a different task. Although electoral support for
the president was strong, top-level policy leadership that strategically used persuasion
and bargaining in order to create a coalition out of separate interests (Weatherford,
2009, pp. 538-539) was indispensible in the case of the Sejong City plan. Inability to
create a strong coalition in support of revision was a serious liability.
Effective policy leadership cannot be exercised in the context of divisions between
the central government and localities and unfavorable political cleavages within the
governing party. Disjointed institutional structure in the government and ruling party
hinders portrayals of abrupt policy change. In addition, when social groups outside of
the government are divided, with regional benefit lines and opposing groups exploiting
political wiles, exercise of entrepreneurial policy change leadership is difficult; each
measure (“lever”) for changing the minds of politicians and constituents fails to work
effectively and will be vulnerable to a counterattack by well-organized opponents.
Institutional trust-building and the degree of legitimacy enjoyed by the government
(Fuchs, 2010, pp. 69-70) are important. From a short-term perspective, it is a priority
task for a policy entrepreneur to build and enhance trust within the ruling camp in
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order to make a sudden policy change. From a long-term perspective, enhancing state
legitimacy is still a fundamental task for elite groups to adapt policy flexibly.
Reflection on Changing Minds
This paradigm of changing minds, based on cognitive theory, explains leadership
effectiveness to a large extent. It is well understood that the political process is a psycho-
logical process of feelings and persuasion (Laswell, 1960, pp. 74-76; Neustadt, 1960, pp.
9-10). Some modifications or adjustments, however, can be made when we deal with the
case in point, without damaging the theoretical basis adopted from Gardner. In this case,
the reason and research levers, which Gardner presents as separate, have been integrated
into one lever, rational argumentation, for the sake of simplicity.1
At the same time, the resistance lever should be more carefully scrutinized when
analyzing the case of a failure to bring about change caused by the existence of strong
opposition groups or an adversary political situation. Originally, this lever dealt with
managing resistance and reducing the resistance aspect of changing minds. But here, it
seemed almost natural to see a tendency to maintain the status quo or resist change in
analyzing every single lever. This author went further and thought that each of the five
levers has two facets: one change inducing, the other change rejecting. If the change-
rejecting aspects of the five levers are stronger than the change-inducing aspects, lead-
ers cannot succeed in changing minds or behaviors (Jogulu, 2010, p. 715). In this case,
the negative side or change-rejecting tendency in the levers of resonance, representa-
tion, resources and rewards, and real-world events, but not rational argument, was ana-
lyzed accordingly.
Furthermore, when a constituted (formal or positional) leader starts to enter a polit-
ical stage with limited tenure, the process aspect of leadership must be emphasized
and carefully scrutinized. Leadership activation should take time, and process manage-
ment of the leadership task as well as initiation of leadership is crucial, especially for a
transformational leader. From a process perspective, leadership involves three sequen-
tial tasks: (1) diagnosing the situation authoritatively, (2) devising a course of action to
resolve the problem, and (3) mobilizing political support (Tucker 1995, pp. 31-34).
The way of carrying out the leadership function of signalizing is very important. Com-
munication, persuasion, and mobilization take time. And the sequence of activities is
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1. The research lever presented by Gardner contains much broader aspects of leadership,
including institutional environment, target groups, and social atmosphere; but in this case,
the author could not trace all the research activities and limited the focus to rational analy-
sis of the situation and devising a new plan.
crucial in structuring a situation and building a community’s support for a prescribed
policy response, because the activities of persuasion and mobilization of support are
different from those of rationally designing a new plan.
In this case, the prime minister carried out the diagnosing and signalizing functions
in a decisive manner, and his team seemed to put forth much of their energy in devis-
ing a revision plan with the backing of higher leadership. The necessity for leadership
to be persuasive arose within the ruling party. Once the whole government, including
the ruling party, had been persuaded, it became necessary for leadership to persuade
the opposition camp and later the populace. The question in the validity of the defini-
tion of the situation and signaling arises in the case, to the worse, the problem of con-
structing collective infrastructures of leadership is at serious stake. The process of con-
sensus building should be given a great deal of weight whenever the government
attempts to change policy in the face of obvious opposition.
Real-world events are very important for persuading key politicians and the public
to change their minds. In this case, it appears to have been difficult to change minds
when publically known principles were strongly held by a powerful politician. It is all
the more difficult when a dense oligarchical atmosphere surrounds a luminous politi-
cal figure who opposes policy change. Also, resistance could not be overcome without
changing the political structure. In this sense, the analytical framework applied here
works effectively in explaining the failure of policy change in this case.
This framework, rooted in historical streams of psychological theory, emphasizes
behavior. At the same time, it has a strong focus on cognition (Sims & Lorenzi, 1992,
pp. 285-305). Policy management is both a behavioral and a cognitive issue. This case
analysis has demonstrated a close relationship between cognitive theory and policy
theory, which should be integrated into policy leadership studies.
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